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PREFACE 
The major objective o£ this research was to determine i£ there is 
a discernible spatial pattern o£ terrorist techniques. Five variables 
were analyzed using the chi squared test o£ signi£icance and the coe£-
£icient o£ correlation. It was £ound that there are certain conditions 
which appear to exert some in£luence over the choice o£ technique in a 
particular situation. 
Two major di££iculties were encountered in the early stages o£ 
this research. The £irst was deciding what speci£ic aspects o£ ter-
rorism I wanted to study. There are numerous interesting aspects which 
I would like to research more thoroughly, but it was apparent that I 
had to limit mysel£ in some manner. The second di££iculty was encoun-
tered when I attempted to obtain data. I was dismayed by the lack o£ 
response by the various government agencies which I contacted as possi-
ble data sources. This is a problem that all who study terrorism will 
face, unless they happen to be working £or one o£ those agencies. 
A third dif£iculty presented itsel£ when my husband and I made the 
decision to move away £rom Stillwater in the middle o£ my research. 
Finishing a thesis is dif£icult enough £or a resident student, and for 
one who is living 250 miles away it can seem like an impossible dream. 
The dream, however, was made possible, not only by my own desire to 
£inish, but also by those who assisted me in various ways. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all o£ these 
persons. I would particularly like to thank my thesis adviser, 
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Dr. Robert E. Norris, for his constant guidance, willingness to help, 
and quick responses to my pleas for assistance. I am also thankful to 
my other committee members, Dr. Keith D. Harries and Dr. George 0. 
Carney, for their advice, encouraging comments, and patience during 
the course of this work. 
I am grateful to my parents for their support, and to my husband, 
Belal, not only for his constant encouragement and confidence in my 
abilities, but also for telling me that I needed to study when I 
didn't really want to. 
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The increase in the number of terrorist incidents in recent years 
has sparked interest and concern in such phenomena all over the world. 
Since 1968 the overall number of incidents has risen dramatically. Most 
authors agree that the terrorism of·today, although it has its roots in 
history, is a relatively recent phenomenon. As Edward F. Mickolus 
pointed out, "although terrorism has been with us for centuries •• , 
its adoption in the last decade by hundreds of groups as a means of 
political expression is new.'' 1 The authors do not agree, however, on 
why terrorism developed into,what it has become, or why it has been 
increasing. The growing interest in the subject of terrorism has 
brought forth a large amount of literature. Even so, terrorism remains 
a very complex problem. As Luigi Bonanate pointed out, "very often it 
has been the object of insults and accusations rather than of analyses, 
giving rise to moralistic positions rather than scholarly discussions," 2 
A review of the available literature on terrorism reveals that the main 
emphasis is on subjective discussiono The actual subject of these dis-
cussions varies considerably, however, little attempt is made to statis-
1 Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, (Westport, Conn., 
1980), p. xii. 
2Luigi Bonanate, "Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism;' 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol, 16, No. 3 (1979), p. 197. 
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tistically support the theories which are set forth in the discussions. 
The apparent lack of analyses of terrorism is perhaps due mainly 
to two factors. Both of these factors, which are also related to one 
another, stem from the very nature of terrorism itselfo They are: 
1) the absence of a widely accepted definition of terrorism and, 2) the 
difficulty of obtaining reliable data. The first factor is, in itself, 
a complex problem. This is evidenced by the amount of literature which 
is devoted solely to defining terrorism. In his article, "Terrorism 
and the Liberal State," Daniel Georges-Abeyie states that" there are 
probably as many definitions of terrorism as there are authors writing 
on the subject."3 One aspect of this problem exists with the distinc-
tion between those acts which are labelled terroristic and those which 
are considered to be simply criminal. As an example of this problem, 
one might consider the question of kidnapping. If a terrorist group 
kidnaps a prominent businessman for the purpose of extorting funds to 
continue their terrorist activities, should this action be considered 
simply a criminal act or an act of terrorism? Another problem involves 
the distinction between, as Frederick Hacker defines it, terror from 
above (imposed by those in power, directed against those not in power) 
and terror from below (imposed by those not in power, directed against 
those in power). 4 This problem was also noted by J. Bowyer Bell as he 
stated, "after all, one man's terror is another's patriotism." .5 It is 
3Daniel Georges-Abeyie, "Terrorism and the Liberal State: A 
Reasonable Response, 11 Police Studies, Vol. 4 (1981), p. 34. 
4Frederick J. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies, (New York, 
1976) • 
.5J. Bowyer Bell, "Transnational Terror and World Order," South 
Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 74 (197.5), p. 40.5. 
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interesting to note that those who some refer to as terrorists are known 
as freedom fighters to others. Another aspect of the definitional com-
plexity is the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, a 
subject which is popular in the literature of terrorism. Because of 
these difficulties, a definition of terrorism must be developed in the 
early stages of analysis, and it must be one which is clear and concise, 
and which addresses the various aspects of terrorism which hinder ob-
jective analysis. 
The second factor which appears to cause difficulties in the study 
of terrorism is the difficulty of obtaining reliable data. Since field 
research tends to be a risky undertaking researchers must depend on 
information which is collected by private sources or that which is 
available from the government. The problems associated with using 
secondary data sources are particularly relevant to the subject of ter-
rorism. Data obtained through private sources may have been collected 
for a specific purpose other than what the researcher intends to use it 
for and the researcher must account for this. Consequently, acts which 
may be purely criminal might have been included as terroristic, or 
vice-versa. This problem is related to the definitional problem such 
that the original source might have developed an entirely different 
definition of terrorism than that which other analysts using the same 
data have developed. This may yield unreliable results. On the other 
hand, data obtained through the government tends to be more reliable. 
It is not, however, very detailed and it is difficult to obtain, and 
therefore the researcher may have to m0dify his analysis in order to 
make use of the data which is available. 
Even so, the problem of terrorism is important enough to warrant 
as much detailed analysis as is possible under the circumstances, As 
Stephen Sloan pointed out, 
while the topic of terrorism is indeed inherently emotive, 
the fact remains that one can and must devise objective 
criteria to study incidents of terrgrism in order to suggest 
alternative responses and policies. 
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It is clear that a problem exists, and it is also clear that not enough 
is known about the problem. In order to understand it more thoroughly, 
analysis is necessary. 
A, Justification for Study 
Stephen Sloan, who was mentioned above, introduces a need for 
scholarly research on terrorism. Sloan feels that the academic com-
munity is the ideal setting for research on terrorism, because of 
increased cooperation among academicians conducting researchv Although 
governmental agencies are conducting research on terrorism, they are 
not always willing to publicize their results, Whereas, terrorist 
groups are increasingly cooperating with each other, governments are 
not willing to cooperate and are therefore incapable of formulating a 
cohesive and coherent response, Sloan continues by stating, 
This lack of a coherent response, particularly in reference 
to the collection and evaluation of information, places a 
particularly heavy responsibility on those within the social 
sciences who study terrorism. They must provide a neutral 
framework where information can be shared, thereby providing 
an opening in the barriers to dissemination that often cate-
gorize the relationships among respective intelligence agencies 
who may not fully share information because of the high levels 
of security consciousness.? 
6stephen Sloan, ''International Terrorism: Academic Quest, Opera-
tional Art, and Policy Implications," Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (1978), p. 2, 
? Ibid., p. 5. 
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Heretofore, those analyses which have been undertaken, particularly 
within the academic community, were mostly performed by those in the 
realms of political science, sociology, and psychology" Why then, 
should a geographic study of terrorism be undertaken? 
The discipline of geography offers a unique viewpoint which allows 
for a broad view of many subjects. Given the properties of terrorism 
and the complex interrelationships between the many aspects which are 
associated with it, it is likely that research which is undertaken from 
a geographic perspective would indeed benefit from such an orientationo 
The nature of terrorism is such that one cannot say that it is purely 
political, nor is it purely economic, or purely social. Consequently, 
researchers of terrorism should be able to incorporate political, econo-
mic, and social aspects into their research. Geographers are, perhaps, 
best qualified to adopt this type of orientation. Even so, is ter-
rorism proper subject matter for geographic study? Haring and Lounsbury 
state that, "any material or non-material thing which can be identified, 
classified, and located is proper subject matter for geographic study:• 8 
Terrorism does, in fact, meet these requirements. 
Terrorism has already been identified as a complex phenomenon. 
Given limited resources it is therefore necessary to limit research on 
terrorism in some manner, by selecting the aspects of terrorism which 
can be analyzed. Therefore, having identified terrorism as proper sub-
ject matter for geographic study, it then must be decided what aspects 
of terrorism will be analyzed. 
8L. Lloyd Haring and John F. Lounsbury, Introduction to Scientific 
Geographic Research, (Dubuque, 1975), p. 8. 
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B. Problem Statement 
The major objective of this research will be to analyze the geo-
graphic aspects of the different methods of terrorist attack. More 
specifically it attempts to answer the following question: Is there a 
discernible spatial pattern of terrorist techniques? After a review of 
the literature on terrorism, five aspects which appear to figure signi-
ficantly in deteimining whether or not a spatial pattern of terrorist 
techniques does exist, were chosen for this analysis. These aspects 
are: regional affiliation, degree of urbanization, level of per capita 
gross national product, freedom of the press, and governmental stabi-
lity. It should be noted that the first aspect, regional affiliation, 
is based sol~ly on locational proximity. Within each major world 
region exist vast political and economic, as well as cultural, differ-
ences. The last four aspects, therefore, represent an attempt to ac-
count for some of these differences. It is hoped that these aspects 
will incorporate into the analysis some of the conditions which may 
nurture differences and similarities in the use of terrorist techniques. 
Each aspect is listed below, followed by some justification and explana-
tion for their inclusion in this research. 
1. Regional ~Affiliation 
Do significant differences exist in the types of techniques em-
ployed from one region to another? A survey of the literature on 
terrorism, particularly those books and articles which emphasize 
terrorism in different areas of the world, indicates that such differ-
ences do exist. According to a State Department publication entitled 
International Terrorism: Hostage Seizures, 47% of all terrorist 
7 
seizures that occurred between 1968 and 1982 took place in Latin America 
whereas, 15.2% took place in Western Europe.9 Another State Department 
publication indicates that of the bombing incidents which are recorded 
for 1982, 60o2% occurred in Western Europe and only 17.2% occurred in 
Lat . Am . 10 1n er1ca. From this it might be concluded that seizing hostages 
is a much more popular technique among Latin American terrorist groups, 
whereas the terrorist groups in Western Europe favor the use of the 
bomb. However, such drastic differences are not observable across all 
regions or all techniques, and the statistics mentioned are not direct-
ly comparable since one involves a time period of 15 years and the 
other includes only one year of data. Even so, significant differences 
can be expected in this analysis. It should be noted that a regional 
analysis of terrorism must be interpreted carefully since each region 
may include individual countries which have not experienced any ter-
rorist attacks, although in such an analysis they would still appear to 
be included within the region. 
2. Degree of Urbanization 
Do significant differences exist among the types of techniques 
employed in countries which are highly urbanized and those employed in 
countries which are not highly urbanized? A common myth about terror-
ism, or unconventional warfare in general, is that the terrorist always 
operates in an urban environment. Guerrillas, on the other hand, are 
9u. s. Department of State, International Terrorism: Ho~tage 
Seizures, (Washington, March, 1983), p. 6. 
10 u. s. Department of State, Patterns of International Terrorism: 
1982, (Washington, September, 1983), p. 8.--
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believed to operate solely in rural environments. Many believe that 
this is the only distinction between the two groups of fighters. How-
ever, this distinction is not entirely true. There are instances where 
terrorist incidents are carried out in rural areas and guerrilla attacks 
have occurred in urban areas. However, there is a general trend that 
supports this myth, and the reasons for the trend are logical. It must 
be remembered that a terrorist group needs a target, and whether it be 
a building or a person, the prime targets are generally located in 
urban areas. Even so, there are some techniques which are more often 
associated with rural environments.- For instance, an ambush might be 
more easily accomplished in a rural setting, or it might be a more popu-
lar technique in a country which is not highly urbanized. Arson, on 
the other hand, is a technique which has as its target a building, and 
therefore may be a more popular technique in urbanized areas, where 
there would be more available targets. Therefore, a significant dif-
ference might be expected between those techniques which are associated 
with more urban targets and those which are associated with rural 
targets. 
3. Level of Per Capita Gross National Product 
Do significant differences exist among the types of techniques 
employed in countries at varying levels of per capita gross national 
product? Per capita gross national product has been chosen for this 
analysis to represent economic differences between countries. Miller 
and Russell (1979) developed a hierarchy of terrorist techniques which 
is based on the level of competence needed by the terrorist group to 
accomplish each technique. As the level of competence increases the 
cost also increases. The hierarchy, from highest level of competence 
to lowest is reproduced in Table Io 
TABLE I 
HIERARCHY OF COMPETENCE REQUIRED 
FOR SELECTED TECHNIQUES 
Mass Destruction 




Facilities Attack/Barricade and Hostage 
Bombing 
Source: Bowman Miller and Charles A. 
Russell, "The Evolution of Rev-
olutionary Warfare: From Mao 
to Marighella and Mei:nhof," in 
Robert Kupperman and Darrell 
Trent (eds.), Terrorism (Stan-
ford, 1979), P• 193. 
It is possible that a similar hierarchy of technique use can be 
formulated by examining economic differences between countries experi-
encing terrorist attacks. Whereas, a homemade bomb can be fashioned 
out of household.materials, a kidnapping or assassination requires more 
sophisticated weaponry, as well as more detailed planningo The 
9 
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differences in competence required to perform each technique might be 
associated with the economic development of the countries involved. 
Another aspect of this variable which might prove to be important is the 
idea that less developed countries might not have as many available 
targets for terrorists. 
4. Freedom of the Press 
Do significant differences exist among the types of techniques 
employed in countries which have different levels of freedom of the 
press? The role of the media in a -terrorist incident has been of con-
siderable interest in recent years. This trend is certainly under-
standable given the nature of terrorism and its dependence on the media 
for free publicity. It is not likely that a terrorist group will 
attempt an incident which will not succeed in bringing attention to 
their long-range goals. Although some terrorist incidents might be 
effectively hidden from the public through suppression of the media, an 
incident of sufficient magnitude will reach the public no matter how 
restrictive the government is. Therefore, it is possible that tech-
niques which are associated with far-reaching consequences will be more 
prevalent in countries which restrict the press. However, this may not 
be proof that incidents of a lesser magnitude do not occur in such re-
strictive countries, rather they simply may not have been included in 
the official reports. 
5. Governmental Stability 
Do significant differences exist among the types of techniques 
employed in countries with relatively stable governments and those 
11 
employed in countries with relatively unstable governments? If a gov-
ernment is relatively unstable it is possible that even the most minor 
incident may cause irreparable harm to the government. On the other 
hand, a major incident, such as the assassination of a major govern-
ment official, might harm even the most stable government. A series of 
incidents would point out the government's inability to deal with the 
situation and this also might threaten the stability of the government. 
If this is so, there should be a significant difference among the types 
of techniques more frequently employed in countries with stable govern-
ments and those employed in countries with relatively unstable govern-
ments. 
6. Summary of Levels of Analysis 
Although the possible differences in the employment of terrorist 
techniques which have been postulated here might be considered to be 
logical assumptions, the conclusions are not a certainty. Also, if 
significant differences are found, the extent to which these differ-
ences occur is not known. These two aspects--whether or not signifi-
cant differences exist and if so, to what extent, will be the main 
focus of this research. If significant differences are found, this 
type of knowledge might be of use to those who are working towards both 
prevention of terrorist incidents as well as development of counter-
terrorist strategies and techniques. Prior knowledge about the trends 
of terrorism in particular areas can help those involved in combatting 
terrorism handle terrorist incidents more efficiently. 
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c. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
Data for this analysis have been collected from a secondary data 
source. Although th~ problems associated with secondary sources have 
already been explained, the secondary source was the only one avail-
able. Several agencies in the United States government were contacted, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Office for Combatting Terrorism, however, none of these 
agencies professed themselves able to help. The data source which was 
used, therefore, is Edward F. Mickolus' book, Transnational Terrorism, 
which is a chronology of terrorist incidents between 1968 and 1979. 
Mickolus is considered to be a leading authority on the subject of ter-
rorism. The data which comprise Mickolus' book come from a computer 
data base developed by him entitled ITERATE (International Terrorism: 
Attributes of Terrorist Events). Mickolus himself notes the difficulty 
in obtaining reliable data on terrorism as he points out, 
the reporting on terrorist incidents is uneven, varying 
with the quality of the reporting source (usually a major 
U.S. or foreign newspaper but sometimes including govern-
ment accounts), the importance of the incident to the 
source, and the success of the terrorists in publicizing 
their acts. 
Mickolus continues by stating that, 
It is unavoidable that there are gaps in the descriptions 
of specific incidents, and some in fact may have been 
conducted by individuals not seeking political goalsa 11 
Mickolus' book consists of a listing of terrorist incidents cate-
gorized by the date of the incidentsa Following the date is the country 
in which the incident took place and a short summary of the incident 
11Mickolus, p. xxxviii. 
including the type of attack. The raw data have been portrayed in a 
matrix form, including all incidents from January 1, 1969 through 
13 
December 31, 1979. For the purpose of this study the definition of ter-
rorism will be one which was developed by the Office for Combatting 
Terrorism, Department of State, as follows: 
Terrorism: The threat or use of violence for political pur-
poses by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in 
opposition to established governmental authority, when such 
actions are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target 
group wider than the immediate victims,12 
This definition coincides very closely with Mickolus' own definition of 
terrorism. 
The categories of terrorist technique which are used by the Central 
Intelligence Agency in their yearly summary reports on terrorism will 
be used for this research. These categories are kidnapping, barricade 
and hostage, explosive bombing, armed assault or ambush, hijacking, 
assassination, incendiary device or arson, and other. It is generally 
agreed that bombs and incendiary devices, such as molotov cocktails, 
are the most popular terrorist techniques because of the relative ease 
in obtaining the necessary materials for construction and the fact that 
throwing a bomb or incendiary device involves relatively little risk to 
the terrorist. There has not, nor is there expected to be, a notice-
able trend towards sophistication in the form of mass destruction 
incidents. Pistols, rifles, and even machine guns are also relatively 
easy to obtain, however, use of these for either an ambush or assassi-
nation attempt also involves careful planning, prior knowledge about 
the victim or victims, and more risk to the terrorists. Such diffi-
12 
U. S. Department of State, (March, 1983), front cover. 
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culties make these techniques less popular than bombs or incendiary 
devices, Kidnapping consists of taking a victim or victims and moving 
them from one place to another, It does not have to include a demand 
for ransom, rather the victims may be simply questioned, held for a 
period of time, and released, Barricade and hostage incidents, on the 
other hand, involve capturing victims but remaining in the place of 
capture, They almost always involve some demands in return for safe 
release of hostages, Hijacking is a mobile barricade and hostage inci-
dent, taking place on some form of transport. The "other" category 
will include those techniques which do not fall into any of the first 
categories and may include a variety of incidents such as sabotage, 
burglary, or the use of chemical substances, 
The eight geographic regions to be used in this analysis are Asia, 
Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, North America, Oceania, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, USSR and Eastern Europe, and Western Europea The 
countries which are included in each of these regions are listed in 
Appendix A. The urbanization categories are based on Banks and Textor's 
A Cross Polity Survey and incorporate the following guidelines: 
la High (20% or more of population in cities of 20,000 
or more and 12.5% or more of population in cities of 
100,000 or more) 
2, Low (less than 20% of population in cities of 20,000 
or more and less than 12.5% of population in cities 
of 100,000 or more),13 
The levels of per capita gross national product are based on figures ob-
tained from a World Bank publication. Categories of per capita gross 
national product were decided upon as follows: 
13Arthur s. Banks and Robert Textor, A Cross Polity Survey, 
(Cambridge, 1963), p. 6o. 
1. Low (gross national product equal to or less than 500 
1978 U.S. dollars) 
2. Medium (gross national product greater than 500 but less 
than or equal to 3,500 1978 U.S. dollars) 
3. High (gross national product greater than 3,500 1978 u.s. 
dollars). 
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The political aspects of this analysis, freedom of the press and govern-
mental stability, will also be categorized according to the survey by 






Complete (no censorship or government control of either 
domestic press or foreign correspondents) 
Intermittent (occasional or selective censorship of either 
domestic press or foreign correspondents) 
Internally Absent (strict domestic censorship; no re-
straint on foreign newsgathering, or selective cable-
head censorship) 
Internally and Externally Absent (strict direct or i~­
direct censorship or control, domestic and foreign)i14 





Government generally stable since World War I or major 
interwar constitutional change 
Government generally stable since World War II or major 
postwar constitutional change 
Government moderately stable since World War II or 
major postwar constitutional change 
Government unstable since World War II or major post-
war constitutional change.15 
The data have been analyzed using the chi squared technique in order 
to test the following hypotheses: 
14Ibid., p. 67. 
15Ibid,, p. 84. 
1. There is a significant difference between the observed 
and expected frequencies among the types of terrorist 
techniques employed in the eight regions of the world. 
2. There is a significant difference between the observed 
and expected frequencies among the types of terrorist 
techniques within the two categories of urbanization. 
J. There is a significant difference between the observed 
and expected frequencies among the types of terrorist 
techniques employed within each of the three categories 
of per capita gross national product. 
4. There is a significant difference between the observed 
and expected frequencies among the types of terrorist 
techniques employed in each of the four categories of 
freedom of the press. 
5. There is a significant difference between the observed 
and expected frequencies among the types of terrorist 
techniques employed within each of the four categories 
of governmental stability. 
Having outlined the proposed research to be undertaken, a review 
of relevant literature on terrorism will be included for more in-depth 
background knowledge of the subjecto This review will make up Chapter 
IIo Chapter III consists of the analysis of the data and Chapter IV 
includes interpretations of the results obtained from the analysis. 
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CHAPTER II 
MAJOR THEMES IN TERRORISM lJTERATURE 
A. Introduction 
It was mentioned in Chapter I that the growing interest in ter-
rorism has brought forth a large~amount of literature. Because of the 
complexity of the subject, most authors tend to emphasize only a few 
aspects of terrorism in their writing. Therefore, the literature of 
terrorism varies widely in perspective. A review of the literature, 
however, does reveal some common ground for discussion. Those themes 
which either pertain directly to this analysis or can be used to illus-
trate one or more of the aspects which reveal the nature of terrorism 
will be included in this review. 
B. The History of Terrorism in Literature 
Many authors have chosen to analyze terrorism in historical con-
text (Laqueur, 1977; Hacker 1976; Miller and Russell, 1979). There is 
a general consensus among these authors that the roots of terrorism 
reach far into the past. Clutterbuck (1980) sees the basis of terror-
ism as dating back to the beginning of civilization, and Laqueur states 
that, "seen in historical perspective the various manifestations of 
terrorism, however different their aims and the political context, had 
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• • II 1 a common or1g1n. 
A somewhat different view of terrorism through the ages is David 
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Fromkin's (1975), who postulated that the basic distinction between ter-
rorism of the past and terrorism of the present is that terrorism is now 
used to destroy governments whereas in the past it was used to sustain 
them. However, many authors would not agree with this distinction, 
because it does not allow for the possibility of state supported 
terrorism. 
Rather than study the history of terrorism, some authors have in-
stead examined historical approaches to the study of terrorism, 
including the various theories which have been postulated through the 
years. Studies such as Luigi Bonanate's (1979) represent valuable 
analyses to which future researchers can refer to and build upon. 
C. Defining Terrorism 
One popular topic in terrorism literature, as well as one of the 
most important aspects of the subject, is the absence of an accepted 
definition of terrorism. Several authors have written extensively on 
the subject, and many others at least mention the problems associated 
with it (Dugard, 1974; Georges-Abeyie and Haas, 1982; Hutchinson, 1972; 
Iviansky, 1977). Hutchinson stated that "unfortunately most modern 
analyses of internal warfare, when they define 'terror' or 'terrorism' 
at all, do not improve on the older attempts and often sacrifice 
1 · t for b · t "2 c ar1 y rev1 y. This suggests that future researchers can and 
lwalter Laqueur, Terrorism, (Boston, 1977), p. 11. 
2Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terror-
ism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1972), P• ,282. 
should learn from the definitional attempts of the past. However, 
unlike Ms. Hutchinson's belief that many researchers fall to do so, 
some literature which deals with the definition of terrorism does 
examine past definitions, and attempts are made to point out the prob-
lems which have been encountered with each. Daniel Georges-Abeyie, 
for instance, uses this technique. After explaining various past and 
present definitions, he concludes, "in sum, there is no single widely 
or universally accepted definition of terrorism."3 Georges-Abeyie 
continues however, by emphasizing that to clarify the concept of 
terrorism, distinctions should be made between terrorism and other 
forms of violence. Once distinction that is made by Georges-Abeyie is 
between a terrorist and a guerrilla. It was previously mentioned that 
the simple differentiation that terrorists operate only in urban areas 
and guerrillas operate only in rural areas is a false oneo Although 
Georges-Abeyie does include a rural focus for guerrillas and an urban 
focus for terrorists he also points out that this differentiation 
is not always true (Table II). 
The clarification of terrorism by distinguishing it from similar 
forms of violence appears to be a good method, and used correctly, 
the distinction can act as a substitution for developing a definition 
in analysis. This could be accomplished by developing criteria by 
which a researcher can decide whether or not a particular incident 
is terroristic or not. 
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3Daniel Georges-Abeyie, "Political Crime and Terrorism," in 
Graeme R. Newman (ed.), Crime and Deviance: A Comparative Perspective, 
Sage Publishing Co., 1980, p. 3~. 
TABLE II 
DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS BETWEEN 
TERRORISTS AND GUERRILLAS 
Terrorist 
1. Urban focus 
2. Object of attack includes 
property and civilians 
Guerrilla 
1. Rural focus is primary 
2o Object of attack usually in-
cludes military, police, or 
government officials 
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3. Operates in small bands of 
terrorist cadre (usually 
three to five members or 
up to 20) 
3. The organization can grow quite 
large and eventually take the 
form of a conventional military 
force 
Source: Daniel Georges-Abeyie, "Political Crime and Terrorism," in 
Graeme R. Newman (ed.), Crime and Deviance: !::. Comparative 
Perspective, Sage Publishing Co., 1980, p. 319. 
Do The Role of the Media 
Not suprisingly, many authors have devoted sections of their 
articles and books to the role of the media in a terrorist incident 
(Alexander, 1978; Redlick, 1979). The subject has been mentioned in 
connection with the fourth level of this analysis which examines the 
effect of freedom of the press on the terrorist's choice of technique. 
Yonah Alexander includes the role of the media as one of ten factors 
which he believes to be the reasons for continued terrorist activities. 
Some of the other factors which are included in this list are a lack 
of understanding of the causes of terrorism, the support of terrorism 
by some governments, weak punishment of terrorists, and loss of resolve 
by governments. Further, Alexander stresses that terrorists use the 
mass media to attain at least one of the following goals: 
1, to enhance the effectiveness of their violence by creating 
an emotional state of extreme fear in target groups, and 
2, to draw forcibly and instantaneously the attention of the 
whole world to themselves in the expectation that these 
audiences will be prepared to act or, in some cases, to 
refrain from acting in a manner 4hat will promote the 
cause they presumably represent. 
Alexander also points out that not only does the mass media provide 
terrorists with free publicity, but also may hinder law enforcement 
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activities by supplying the terrorists with information concerning what 
officials are planning in retaliation. 
Amy Sands Redlick feels that the media, because of the flow of in-
formation it creates, has a catalytic effect on terrorism. Redlick 
lists three reasons why this flow has such an effect on terrorism: 
1) it provides technical information for terrorist groups to be used 
in planning incidents, 2) it has contributed to the justification of the 
use of violence through groups being able to observe the successes and 
failures of other groups, and 3) in an ethnically divided society such 
as exists today, groups which might normally have no contact now cooper-
ate with each other as sources of information because of increased 
communications. 
Some authors have mentioned that terrorism is like the theater, 
because it feeds on the effect it makes on the audience. With new ad-
vances in media communications, the audiences for terrorist incidents 
are suddenly much larger. The actual effect of the mass media on 
4Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Police," in 
Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent (eds.), Terrorism, (Stanford, 1979), 
pp. 332-333. 
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terrorism is much more complex than the few ideas which have been pre-
sented in this review. However, they do at least give some indication 
of the importance of the mass media to terrorism and suggest a link 
between terrorism and the degree of freedom of the press within a 
country. 
E. The Trends of Terrorism 
In order to keep terrorism in perspective, articles and book which 
analyze the trends of terrorism are important (Carlton, 1979; Jenkins, 
1978; Wilkinson, 1979). Brian Jenkins includes a yearly summary of 
terrorist incidents as well as a summary of the number of killings 
resulting from terrorist incidents. Jenkins also examines the public 1 s 
perception of terrorism each yearo He notes that there is a discre-
pancy between the public's perception and the actual statistics about 
what is a "good year" and what is a "bad year" numerically. He offers 
a possible explanation for this discrepancy by stating that "terrorism 
is not simply what terrorists do, but the effect--the publicity, the 
alarm--they create by their actions."5 Jenkins concludes that the 
future is likely to bring about the emergence of a new sub-culture of 
terrorism as it becomes more mafia-like. 
Unlike Jenkins, Carlton chooses only to make general interpreta-
tions of the trends of terrorism in the future. He does, however, 
offer four determinants which, in combination, are believed to hold the 
answer to whether or not terrorism will increase. These are: 1) ~he 
rate of technological innovation as it affects terrorism in the devel-
5Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: Trends and Potentiali-
ties," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 32, Noo 1 (1978), p. 119o 
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opment of techniques for terrorism and counterterrorism, 2) self-
imposed restraints on the part of the terrorists based on the idea that 
they do not want to outrage the public and the government to such a 
point that they lose all public sympathy and support, 3) countermeasures 
which are available to individual sovereign states for prevention of 
terrorism or effective handling of terrorist incidents when they do 
occur, and 4) the international dimension of the prevention and promo-
tion of terrorism involving both increased cooperation between govern-
ments to control terrorism and increased cooperation between terrorist 
groups to attain their goals. Carlton concludes that terrorism is 
likely to increase within certain limits. 
F. Typologies and Classifications of Terrorism 
In order to overcome the difficulties arising from the definition-
al disagreement of terrorism, some authors have instead elected to 
develop typologies or classification schemes (Bell, 1975; Iviansky, 
1977; Karber, 1971; Shultz, 1978). Typologies represent a method by 
which the scope of a subject under analysis can be limited, and there-
fore are very valuable in the study of terrorism. 
Some of the classification schemes simply attempt to divide dif-
ferent types of terrorism according to selected variables. J. Bowyer 
Bell, for instance, lists three ways in which terror might be employed 
which are differentiated by the relationship between the victim (the 
actual object of attack) and the target (the individual or group which 
is expected to react to the incident). The three ways of employing 
terror are functional, provocative, and symbolico In the first, 
functional, the aim is to remove a particular asset (or victim) and 
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therefore, the victim is the same as the targeto Provocative terror 
means that the victim is attacked but the target does not react ap-
propriately, instead of giving into demands the target is provoked into 
action. Symbolic terror involves a victim which is representative of 
the target. For example, the victim might be a corporate executive, the 
target is the corporation. 
Another simple classification scheme is Ze'ev Iviansky's, which 
consists of three types of terrorism: that which is associated with 
anarchy, that which is associated with social revolution, and that which 
is associated with national liberation. According to Iviansky, these 
three types of terrorism are distinctly different from each other as 
they are employed in the contemporary world. Terrorism which is associ-
ated with anarchy is not backed by a group, rather it is carried out by 
an individual. The terrorism of a social revolution involves terrorist 
groups whose goals include freedom from tyranny within the group's own 
society. The third type of terrorism includes terrorist groups who are 
fighting the cause of national liberation from foreign rule. This 
classification is based on distinctions between the motives of the 
terrorists. 
Richard Shultz outlines a more detailed and comprehensive typology 
by beginning with a discussion of past typologies. Among these are 
E. V. Walter's two-part typology,(terrorism employed by those aspiring 
to power; and terrorism employed by those in power) and Paul Wilkinson's 
three-part typology (revolutionary terrorism which is directed towards 
bringing about a complete change of basic social processes, sub-
revolutionary terrorism which is an attempt to bring about some changes 
within the existing system, and repressive terrorism which is employed 
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to restrain certain groups from unaccept~ble behavior). Shultz explains 
the problems of Wilkinson's typology thus, "finally, and most signifi-
cantly, Wilkinson's three dimension typology is not accompanied by a 
set of variables that allow.for more rigorous and discriminate classi-
fication."6 Shultz continues by saying that with such a set of vari-
ables a researcher should be able "to generate and test broader and 
more comparatively derived hypotheses."? Shultz's typology includes 
Wilkinson's three-dimension typology to which is added seven variables 
which are considered to be significant in classifying terrorism. These 
variables are causes (conditions--economic, political, social or 
psychological--which may cause a group to resort to violence), environ-
ment (either contained within one country or global), goals (the objec-
tives of the terrorist group), strategy (the planning of methods to 
bring about the objectives), means (the techniques which are available), 
organization (the structure which is used for planning and execution), 
and participation (the type of person who takes part in terrorism). 
The emergence of similarities as well as differences between and within 
categories of this typology may lead to the introduction of new vari-
ables for further research. 
Typologies enable researchers to precisely define their categories 
and thereby subject their data to more rigorous analysis. The basic 
goal of most typologies is to progress from subjectivity to objectivity, 
a progression which should be helpful in the study of terrorism. 
6Richard Sh~ltz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology," 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1978), p. 9. 
?Ibid. 
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G. Psychosociological Studies of Terrorism 
Articles such as those by Paul Wilkinson (1979) and David Fromkin 
(1975) include explanations of the authors' attempts at analyzing the 
reasons behind terrorism and terrorist strategies. Wilkinson, for 
example, emphasizes the variations on the theory of frustration and 
aggression, Basically, this theory postulates that if an individual is 
unable to attain the goals he has set for himself he becomes frustrated 
and the frustration may lead to aggression. The aggression often is 
manifested in some form of violencea Closely linked to these articles 
are those in which the author stresses the psychosociological aspects 
of terrorism. 
Although Hannah Arendt (1969) places most of her emphasis on state 
violence she makes some very enlightening statements concerning the re-
lationship between power and violence. She feels that power and vio-
lence are opposites, where one rules absolutely the other is absent, 
This would suggest that terrorist groups can never hope to gain power, 
unless they eventually abandon their violent tactics. 
~ederick Hacker (1976) lists three types of terrorists which are 
differentiated by the motivation each one possesses: the crazy, driven 
by reasons of his own that often do not make sense to normal people; 
the criminal, who uses illegitimate means to obtain personal gainJ and 
the crusader, who is idealistically inspired. It is the last type, 
the crusader, that Hacker believes is the genuine terrorist. 
H. Unique Approaches in the 
Literature of Terrorism 
Equations, computers, and statistics are somewhat rare in the 
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literature of terrorism and therefore qualify as unique approaches. One 
such analysis is described by James P. Bennet and Thomas L. Saaty 
(1979). The authors used the Munich incident as their case study and 
developed a matrix composed of the actors which vrere involved in the 
incident (i.e., the terrorists, the German government, the Israeli 
government, the Arab world, and the hostages). Assuming that each of 
these actors possessed varying degrees of dominance in determining the 
outcome of the incident, the researchers developed a scale, ranging 
from one to nine to represent the degrees of dominance, and these 
numbers were transferred to the matrix. For example, although the 
terrorists were of equal importance as the German government in deter-
mining the outcome of the incident (denoted on the matrix as a one), 
they possessed considerably more dominance over the matter than did 
the hostages (denoted as an eight). The matrix for these actors only, 
therefore, would be as shown in Table III. 
TABLE III 
MATRIX OF VALUES FOR THREE ACTOR GROUPS 
Terrorists Gennan Hostages 
Government 
Terrorists 1 1 8 
German 
Government 1 8 
Hostages 1 
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The values from the matrix are substituted into a formula which is 
designed to calculate the probability of each of the possible outcomes" 
If the prediction power of this method proves to be high 1 it could be 
a valuable asset to counterterrorism strategists by better equipping 
them to deal with such incidentso 
Somewhat similar to Bennet and Satty's proposed statistical equa-
tion is a model developed from research which was conducted under the 
supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. The theory and model 
are based on the theory that frustration leads to agression which was 
described in the previous section. Given four types of actor groups 
as listed in Table IV, and three sets of variables, the model is used 
to predict what form violence will take under given circumstances. 
The specific kinds of groups involved will vary from country 
to country, and even from time to time within the same 
country. But in all cases, the extent to which the model's 
basic variables are perceived as prevailing among the four 
types of actor groups will provide the bas~s for predicting 
the extent and form of political violence" 
The four possible forms of violence are turmoil manifested in riots or 
demonstrations (pro-regime, mass-oriented), insurgency which includes 
terrorist acts or small-scale guerrilla operations (pro-regime, elite-
oriented), conspiracy in the form of attempted coups (anti-regime, 
elite-oriented), and internal war including civil war or large-scale 
revolutions (anti-regime, mass-oriented). One problem with this model 
is that it involves the use of "expert judgements" of the terrorist 
groups which are being studied, and it is often difficult to obtain 
an "expert judgement" on any subject. However, the method of model 
8central Intelligence Agency, Profile of Violence: ~ Ana1ytical 
Model, (Washington, 1976), p. J. 
development could be very important in the study of terrorism, as 
models enable researchers to examine representations of complex phe-



















Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Profile of 
Violence: An Analytical Model, (Washington, 
1976). -
Daniel Georges-Abeyie has already been mentioned in connection 
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with literature dealing with the definition of terrorism. His article, 
"Terrorism by the Bomb: A National Perspective for the Year 1975," 
coauthored by M. M. Zandi, represents an example of statistical analy-
sis of terrorism that includes a geographical interpretation. Among 
the analyses which were performed for this study are the type of device 
in relation to the region in which the incident took place, the type 
of device in relation to the state in which the incident occurred, and 
the region in which the incident occurred by the motive behind the 
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Psychic terror rather than killings or maimings was the 
most common result of the bombings. 
• • • commercial enterprises were the foremost objects 
of attack. 
The most highly urbanized and industrial states were 
also the states with the most bombing incidents. 
The largest number of incidents occurred in cities 
with populations under 25,000.9 
Although this research is a good example of the type of objective 
analysis which can be performed on the subject of terrorism, there are 
several limiting features of this analysis which should be mentioned. 
The data covers only bombings in the United States during 1975. In 
order to analyze the trends of bombings in the United States it would 
perhaps be better to analyze data from several different years. Also 
the analysis which was used to examine the region of incident by the 
motive included an unknmm category of motive which contained over 
half of the total incidents. Despite these criticisms, however, the 
article does represent analysis that can and should be done on ter~ 
rorism data. 
The Central Intelligence Agency provides yearly summary reports 
on terrorism which are similar in form to Georges-Abeyie and Zandi's 
analysis. Rather than simply analyzing terrorism in the United States 
however, the Central Intelligence Agency analyzes the worldwide trends 
of terrorism. The conclusions gained from these analyses constitute 
the summary reports. By examining terrorism worldwide the Central 
9Daniel Georges-Abeyie and M. M. Zandi, "Terrorism by the Bomb: 
A National Perspective for the Year 1975," Journal of Environmental 
Systems, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1978-79), P• 333. 
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Intelligence Agency reports necessarily lack the detail of the study 
by Georges-Abeyie and Zandi. One of the goals of these reports is to 
"set the scope and nature of international terrorism into historical 
perspective as well as to draw attention to those trends and develop-
. ..10 ments that appear to be of particular lmportance. All figures in 
these reports are given in percentages or raw figures. Examples of 
the information which is included in these books include percentage of 
total incidents by geographic distribution (region) and number of inci-
dents by category (technique). 
Another unique approach to the study of terrorism is a computer 
system described by Brian Jenkins and D. A. Waterman (1979). The 
system is designed to help formalize ill-defined problems in the social 
sciences (such as terrorism). Within the system, data are represented 
as objects, and each object can have any number of attribute-value 
pairs. For example, if the object is a hypothetical bombing of Mr. 
Smith, the following attriqute-value pairs, as listed in Table V, 
might be included. Other relevant data might be added to the system, 
such as information about the terrorist group which claimed responsi-
bility, motive, number of injuries resulting from the incident, and 
others. The system not only aids the analyst in organizing infor.ma-
tion but also it is equipped with a deductive capability which is 
enacted through If-Then statements, 
One of the goals for the future of this system is to develop 
computer programs that are capable of making predictions about future 
events. If this goal is realized it would certainly enhance those 
10 
U. S. Department of State, (September 1983), p. 1. 
working towards prevention of terrorism. 
TABLE V 
ATTRIBUTE-VALUE PAIRS FOR A HYPOTHETICAL 
BOMBING INCIDENT 







Name of Incident: 
Value 





Chicago Bombing 001 
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Rodger M. Govea (1980) argues in favor of teaching about political 
terrorism at the college level. In order for the students to benefit 
from the course, Govea lists eight commonly-held myths of terrorism 
which must be dispelled. The myths represent some of the common per-
ceptions which the public holds as truths and are listed here so that 
readers of this work will not be hampered by such preconceived notions: 
1. Political terrorism is the exclusive province of anti-
governmental forces. 
2. The purpose of political terrorism is the production 
of chaos. 
3. Political terrorism is the province of madmen. 
4. Political terrorism is criminal activity. 
5. All insurgent violence is political terrorism. 
6. Governments always oppose nongovernmental terrorism. 
7. Terrorism is exclusively a problem relating to internal 
political conditions. 
8. Political terrorism is a strategy of futility. 11 
The greatest acheivement of a class on political terrorism is that it 
would promote greater awareness and understanding of the subject, 
thereby aiding the general public's comprehension of terrorism. 
Similar to the idea that terrorism is analogous to the theater is 
Phillip Karber's (1971) analogy between terrorism and a communications 
medium. Karber states that there are four basic components of terror-
ism, and each of these can be equated with one particular facet of a 
communications medium. The four components, along with their counter-
parts tn communications are: 
1. Terrorist: transmitter 
2. Target group: intended recipient 
J. Tactic (bombing, ambush, etc.): message 
4. Reaction of target group: 12 feedback 
This analogy is interesting because it provides an alternative concept 
of terrorism that can aid in gaining more insight into the subject. 
One of the questions examined by Daniel Georges-Abeyie (1981) is: 
What is a proper response to terrorism? Although many argue that ter-
rorism is directed mainly against liberal governments, Georges-Abeyie 
notes that, "in 1976, 75 percent of the nations (with terrorist 
11Rodger M. Govea, "Terrorism as a Political Science Offering," 
Teaching Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1980), p. 4o 
12Phillip Karber, "Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and A Concep-
tual Framework," Social Science Quarterly, No. 52 (1971), pp. 521-533. 
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organizations) were either authoritarian or totalitarian states."13 
However, the authoritarian and totalitarian governments are better 
equipped than liberal governments to deal with terrorism, because 
stricter punishments can be enforced and repressive measures can be 
executed without public dissent. Liberal governments, on the other 
hand, are restricted in what they can do, because repressive measures 
are not condoned within liberal societies. It is therefore, more dif-
ficult for the liberal governments to control terrorism. The proper 
response to terrorism is dictated not so much by what the terrorists 
have done, but rather by the type of society they are operating within. 
The examples of unique approaches to terrorism presented here are 
representative of the great variety of views held by the experts on 
terrorism. They incorporate varying ideologies and beliefs, they pre-
sent innovative methods for studying terrorism, and they present 
differing theories on the bases of terrorism. Although separately, 
some may present narrow views of terrorism, collectively they provide 
insight into the nature of terrorism, and as such, provide background 
material for understanding and for undertaking research on terrorism. 
J. Geographic Literature on Terrorism 
Upon examining geographic literature which pertains to the subject 
of terrorism, little was found. Aside from the articles by Daniel 
Georges-Abeyie which have been mentioned several times, it is diffi-
cult to locate geographers who have studied the subject. There are, 
however, articles which deal indirectly with terrorism. Among these 
i3Daniel Georges-Abeyie (1981), p. 35. 
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related articles are those included in the realm of military geography. 
During World War I and, to a larger extent, during World War II, the 
importance of geographic information in military planning was discovered 
and pursued. In 1944, Colonel Sidman Poole wrote an article in which 
he stressed the importance of a strong background in both geographic 
and military training in order for military strategists to be better 
equipped for planning. However, this article deals with the importance 
of geographic information in a situation of conventional warfare and 
terrorism is considered to be a form of unconventional warfare. 
More closely related to the subject of terrorism is an article by 
Robert W. McColl (1969) in which he examined revolutionary movements 
in the form of guerrilla warfare. The differences between guerrilla 
warfare and terrorism have already been outlined (Table II), but des-
pite these differences, both are considered to unconventional warfare. 
McColl points out that, 
virtually every aspect of the revolutionary process has under-
gone intense study. There remains one element, however, that 
has not received adequate attention. This is the geographic 
aspect in the evolution, as well as definition, of revolu-
tionary movements.14 
Although one might expect to find geographic literature on ter-
rorism within the. realm of political geography, a review of the litera-
ture proves that this is not true. As R. J. Johnston (1980) points 
out political geographers generally study consensus rather than con-
flict, and this perhaps explains the absence of the study of terrorism 
in political geography. Johnston developed a working definition of 
14Robert W. McColl, "The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of 
Revolution," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 59, 
No. 4 (1969), p. 614. --
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political geography as follows: "Political geography is the study of 
those economic and social conflicts which focus on the state and which 
I 1115 have clear spatial and or environmental components, Examining this 
definition of political geography it is apparent that this would in-
elude the study of terrorism, as it is a form of economic and social, 
as well as political, conflict. It is unfortunate that political geo-
graphers have chosen not to study terrorism, since they would be well 
equipped to handle the subject, 
K. Summary 
Although this literature review is by no means an exhaustive one, 
it does represent a good sample of the information which is available 
on terrorism. Other aspects of terrorism which were only examined to 
a limited degree and not included in this review include legal aspects, 
available strategic and tactical countermeasures, and case studies of 
specific groups. However, it should be mentioned that literature is 
available on these subjects. 
In order to summarize this review, some of the more important 
themes will again be mentioned. Among these are literature which 
deals with the history of terrorism and the history of the study of 
terrorism, Also included was information on the definition of terror-
ism and suggested typologies of the use of terrorism, The role of the 
media is an important aspect in the study of terrorism as is the analy-
sis of the trends of terrorism, 
15R. J a Johnston, "Political Geography Without Politics," Progress 
in Human Geography, Vola 4 (1980), p. 440. 
Empirical analyses were far less 'common than other types of 
studies. The use of statistics in terrorism research is relatively 
rare. This gap in the literature is one which has been noted by 
other authors. As Richard Shultz said, 
while an intense study has ensued this post-war prolifera-
tion of political terrorist incidents, the literature has 
been primarily descriptive, prescriptive and very emotive 
in form. Very few studies have approached the issue f~om a 
more analytical, theoretical, and objective position.16 
The many views of terrorism which are represented in this review 
are evidence of the complexity of the subject. The subjective nature 
of the majority of the articles is because many of the authors are 
attempting to explain one or more aspects of terrorism. Although this 
explanation is necessary, those attempting to prevent terrorism need 
to have access to more information than those explanations provide. 
It is obvious that the study of terrorism has progressed admirably 
through the years and one might conclude that it will continue to 
progress as more innovative techniques for studying terrorism, such as 
the computer system, the model developed for the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the typologies are developed and expanded. There is a 
need for more quantitative analyses and it is hoped that this study 
will help to fill that void. 
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This chapter is concerned with statistical analysis of the data, 
including details on data classification and portrayal, as well as the 
chi squared calculationso The first part of this chapter includes nine 
world maps. Eight of these maps portray the distribution of the eight 
terrorist techniques which are being evaluated in this research, the 
ninth is an overall picture of the total number of terrorist incidents 
worldwide. Each of these maps has been interpreted in an attempt to 
determine if any discernible spatial patterns exist, and the interpre-
tations are described in the subsequent sections. 
A. Total Number of Terrorist Incidents 
Figure 1, which portrays the total number of terrorist incidents 
worldwide by country, reveals that much of the world has experienced 
terrorism to a certain degree. Only one large area of the world has 
been relatively untouched by terrorism--West Africa. More specifically, 
the countries in West Africa which have not experienced any terrorism 
are all within one region, Sub-Saharan Africao The entire continent 
of Africa appears to have experienced very little terrorism since all 
countries except Ethiopia and Zimbabwe are included within one of the 
two lowest categories of numbers of incidents. The Soviet Union and 




• 50 -149 
I c 1 c i 
0 2000 mi. 
Source : Edward Mickolus , Transnational Terrorism, 1980. 




world regions have experienced terrorism in varying degrees, with Latin 
America, North America, Western Europe and the Middle East being the 
regions which are plagued the most by terrorism. 
B. Incendiary Device or Arson 
The areas which appear to have experienced the most attacks of an 
incendiary nature include the United States, Western Europe and Latin 
America according to Figure 2. Although the Middle East has experienced 
much terrorism overall, as pointed out in the preceding section, the 
incendiary device or arson has not been used widely in this area. The 
three countries which have had the highest number of incidents which 
involved this technique are the United States, West Germany, and Italy, 
all highly urbanized and highly industrialized countries. 
c. Explosive Bombing 
The widespread use of the explosive bomb is evident in Figure 3. 
Again, North America, Western Europe, and Latin America are the areas 
which have experienced the highest number. of bombing incidents. There 
have also been a relatively large number of bombings in Asia and it 
should be noted that this technique is the only one which is so notable 
in Asia. 
D. Hijacking 
Because of the nature of hijacking, it can be assumed that the 
countries which have experienced the most hijackings are those in which 
there are more available targets. Therefore, the highest numbers of 
hijackings should be occurring in countries which are highly urbanized 
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and industrialized, Figure 4, however, does not necessarily reflect 
this assumption, In fact, Figure 4 reveals that the highest number of 
incidents have occurred in the United States, Ethiopia, and the 
Philippines, and although the United States is highly urbanized, 
neither Ethiopia nor the Philippines are, Although these countries are 
similar with respect to categories of hijackings, however, a great dis-
crepancy exists in the actual number of incidents occurring in each 
country. The United States experienced 48 hijackings, but only five 
took place in both Ethiopia and the Philippines, 
E. Barricade and Hostage 
Figure 5 portrays a pattern which differs greatly from those of 
the previous maps, Although all of the preceding maps showed that 
North America, Western Europe, and Latin America experienced the most 
incidents of each of the first three techniques, Figure 5 reveals that 
Latin America, particularly South America, has experienced relatively 
few barricade and hostage incidents. The United States and Western 
Europe, however, are again the leading areas for this technique, This 
difference in the distributions raises many questions pertaining to 
the conditions which might have resulted in this situationo 
F. Assassination 
The most obvious aspect of Figure 6 is not those areas which fall 
into the categories of highest number of assassination incidents, but 
rather those which are included within the lower categories. This 
would include Asia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as 
the Middle East with the exception of Lebanon and Iran, This pattern 
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is possibly a reflection of the stricter security measures in these 
areas and the inability of the terrorists ~o reach the possible targets. 
G. Armed Assault or Ambush 
The conclusion reached in the interpretation of Figure 3, which 
portrays'the number of explosive bombings, can be applied also to 
Figure 7. That conclusion is that the employment of these techniques 
is very widespread. No particularly distinguishable pattern of distri-
buiion occurs because the techniques have been used worldwide. Popu-
larity of this technique may be attributed in part to the availability 
of firearms for terrorist groups. 
H. Kidnapping 
The technique of kidnapping has been used more often in Latin 
America than anywhere else in the world, as Figure 8 reveals. Even 
North America and Western Europe have experienced relatively few kid-
nappings compared to Latin America. This is particularly interesting 
because kidnapping is very similar to a barricade,and hostage incident, 
but according to Figure 5 very few barricade and hostage incidents 
have taken place in Latin America. 
JG Other 
Figure 9 reveals that Latin America is the region where more inci-
dents of an "other" nature have taken place. This is partly due to 
the high number of robberies that have been carried out by terrorist 
groups in Latin America. Africa, on the other hand, has been almost 
completely untouched by any incidents of this nature. 
Source : Mickolus , 1980. 
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K. Summary of Map Interpretations 
The various maps 'irhich have been assembled here portray many 
interesting patterns of terrorism. Although terrorism itself is vir-
tually a worldwide phenomenon, the different techniques which are em-
ployed by terrorists are used with varying frequency in all areas. It 
appears that there are conditions which make the use of certain tech-
niques preferred in some areas. These conditions are most likely made 
up of a complex set of interrelated factors which lead to the situa-
tions which have been portrayed and interpreted" The following calcu-
lations are designed to test a limited number of factors which might 
exert some influence on these conditions. 
L. Data Analysis 
As was mentioned in Chapter I, the data source for this analysis 
was Edward F. Mickolus' book, Transnational Terrorism. The raw data 
were collected and portrayed in a matrix which has been included in 
Appendix B. Because of the size of this matrix direct interpretation 
is difficult. Data, therefore, have been divided according to the 
categories organized for each of the five proposed levels of analysis. 
This facilitated the statistical analysis of the data. 
Data were analyzed using the chi squared technique. Chi squared 
is a popular test of significance because there are few assumptions 
associated with it. Data may be of any level of measurement, but must 
be randomly selected. Chi squared, however, should be used only with 
samples that have relatively large expected frequencies. Most pro-
fessional statisticians agree that if any cell has an expected 
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frequency less than five, the test should not be used because it may 
yield a value which is an overestimation and, therefore, not valid. 
In order to overcome this restriction it is possible to collapse some 
of the categories, however, some information will be lost in this 
process. Combining categories should be done only if necessary, and 
the decision to combine must be carefully considered. Very large 
frequencies are also undesirable as this may result in an inflated 
chi squared value. 
The following sections consist of the chi squared calculations for 
each of the five levels of analysis, as well as the results of the 
tests. The level of significance has been set at .05 for all five 
analyses. Each level of analysis will include a null hypothesis and a 
research hypothesis and based on the information given above, the 
decision to accept or reject the null hypothesis will be made. 
1. Level 1 - Regional 
Calculation of chi squared for Level 1 yielded several cells with 
expected frequencies less than five. Although collapsing categories is 
a possibility, it did not appear to be a feasible solution in this 
situation. The four regional categories which contained expected 
frequencies less than five were USSR and Eastern Europe, Asia, Oceania, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Since these four regions have little in common 
and, therefore, could not logically be combined, it was instead decided 
that they be dropped from this analysis. The resulting chi squared 
matrix, therefore, includes only four regional categories: North 
America, Latin America, Western Europe, and Middle East and North 
Africa. Statistically, these four regions are also the areas where 
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the majority (88.9%) of terrorist activity takes place and, therefore, 
the analysis should still have merit despite the elimination of some 
of the data. 
are: 
The null hypothesis (H0) and research hypothesis (H1) for Level 1 
There is no difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed in the major world regions which experi-
ence the majority of terrorist attacks. 
There is a difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed in the major world regions which experi-
ence the majority of terrorist attacks. 
The resulting chi squared value is 379a5 (Table VI) and, therefore, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected and the research hypothesis accepted. 
A significant chi squared value does not reveal a strong relation-
ship between two variables, only that a significant difference exists. 
To teBt the strength of the association between these variables the 
coefficient of contingency (c) was also calculated. Calculation of C 
for Level 1 resulted in a value of .38, which indicated that although a 
significant association does exist, it is not particularly strong. 
Further examination of the chi squared matrix reveals which cate-
gories display the largest discrepancies between the observed and ex-
pected values. If these discrepancies can be matched with the patterns 
revealed by the maps, more in-depth interpretation is possible. For 
this level of analysis, the greatest discrepancies are in the cate-
gories of explosive bombing and kidnapping, particularly in Western 
Europe and Latin America. More specifically, bombings occurred more 
often in Western Europe than would be expected, whereas less kidnappings 
occurred. The opposite is true for Latin America. It was mentioned 
in Chapter I that more bombings occurred in Western Europe and more 
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kidnappings occurred in Latin America. Calculation of a significant 
chi squared value would appear to statistically support this pattern. 
There is also a large discrepancy between observed and expected fre-
quencies in the category of armed assault or ambush. In this category 
Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa experienced more 
armed assaults and North America and Western Europe experienced less. 
2. Level 2 - Degree of Urbanization 
There is no difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed in highly urbanized countries and 
countries which are not highly urbanized. 
There is a difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed in highly urbanized countries and 
countries which are not highly urbanized. 
The calculated chi squared value for Level 2 is 95.5 (Table VII). 
The null hypothesis is again rejected and one can conclude, therefore, 
that there is a significant difference between the observed and ex-
pected values. The calculated C value is .20, revealing again that 
there is not a very strong association between these two variables. 
The chi squared matrix reveals that the biggest discrepancy between 
the observed and expected frequencies occurs again in the category of 
explosive bombing. Countries which are highly urbanized have experi-
enced more bombing incidents than would be expected, and countries 
which are more rural have experienced less. 
A relatively large discrepancy was also found again in the cate-
gory of kidnapping. In this instance, however, the figures reveal 
that more kidnappings occurred in rural countries, whereas less 
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TABLE VII 
URBANIZATION ANALYSIS 
High Low Total 
Armed 229.8 31.1 
Assault or 
Ambush 220 41 261 
88.9. 12.C·. 
Assassination 
88 13 101 
Barricade 68.6 9.3: 
and Hostage 
63 15 78 
Explosive 1003.7 136.2 
Bombing 
1045 95 1140 
110.0 14.9 
Hijacking 
114 11 125 
Incendiary 282.6: 38.) 
Device or 
Arson 297 24 321 
177.8 24.1 
Kidnapping 
141 61 202 
123.2 16.7 
Other 
117 23 140 
Total 2085 283 2368 
p = .05; 7 degrees of f~eedom '){. 2 = 95.5 
Source: Calculated by author. 
3. Level 3 - Economic (Gross National Product) 
There is no difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed among countries with varying levels of 
per capita gross national product. 
There is a difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed among countries with varying levels of 
per capita gross national product. 
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The calculated chi squared value for Level 3 is 208o5 (Table VIII)o 
Again, the null hypothesis is rejected and the research hypothesis 
accepted. The degree of association between gross national product 
and terrorist technique is also not very strong as shown by a value 
of .28 when C is calculated. 
The greatest discrepancy' between observed and expected values also 
follows the pattern set in the two previous levels of analysis, occur-
rir~ in the category of explosive bombing. This discrepancy is more 
evident in countries with either medium or high level gross national 
products, however, than in countries with relatively low gross national 
products. It was expected that countries with low gross national 
products would experience more bombings than expected, however, the 
opposite was found to be true. 
A discrepancy was also found in the kidnapping category, particu-
larly in medium and high level countries. The countries with low 
and medium level gross national products experienced many more kidnap-
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4. Level 4 - Freedom of the Press 
As in the regional level of analysis, the calculation of chi 
, 
squared for Level 4 was hampered by small expected frequencies. In 
this situation it was decided that collapsing the categories would 
overcome the problem without creating additional complications. There-
fore, instead of the original four categories of freedom of the press--
complete, intermittent, internally absent, and internally and external-
ly absent--the last two were combined into one category, internally 
and/or externally absent. The result was that all expected frequencies 
less than five were eliminated. The null and research hypotheses for 
this revised analysis, therefore, are: 
There is no difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed among countries with varying degrees 
of freedom of the press. 
There is a difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed among countries with varying degrees 
of freedom of the press. 
Again, the result of the chi squared test allows one to reject the 
null hypothesis and accept the research hypothesis, with a calculated 
value of 119.7 (Table IX). C is equal to .22 for Level 4 and this 
indicates that the association between these two variables, though 
signi:flcant, is not strong. 
In this situation, the largest discrepancies exist, not in the 
explosive bombing and kidnapping categories, but rather in the armed 
assault or ambush category and the incendiary device or arson category, 
particularly in countries with either complete or intermittent freedom 
of the press. There is also a discrepancy, though not as large, in 
the category of explosive bombing. 
TABLE IX 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ANALYSIS 
· Internally 
Complete Intermittent and/or 
Armed 134.9 86.2' 
Assault or 




Barricade 35.8 22.9' 
and Hostage 
35 21 






Incendiary 163.9 . 104.8 
Device or 







Total 1198 766 
p = .05; 14 degrees of freedom 































5. Level 5 - Governmental Stability 
There is no difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed among countries with varying degrees 
of governmental stability. 
There is a difference in the types of terrorist tech-
niques employed among countries with varying degrees 
of governmental stability. 
The calculated chi squared value for Level 5 is 244.9 (Table X), 
therefore, the research hypothesis can be accepted. The degree of 
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association between governmental stability and terrorist techniques is 
again not very strong as shown by a value of C equal to .31. 
As in Levels 1, 2, and 3, the greatest discrepancies can be found 
in the categories of explosive bombing and kidnapping. These discre-
pancies, however, exist mainly in countries with highly stable govern-
ments and in countries with highly unstable governments and not in 
countries with generally or moderately stable governments. This pattern 
is repea te.d to a lesser degree in the amed assault or am bush category. 
M. Summary of Results 
The nine world maps at the beginning of this chapter portrayed 
many interesting patterns for interpretation. The maps, however, were 
designed to portray the global pattern of the use of the eight types of 
terrorist techniques. Although they also showed the regional aspects 
of this study, they did not portray the differences in the use of tech-
niques for the other four levels of analysis, because they did not show 
which countries are included in each of the variable categories. To 
graphically portray these differences, divided proportional circles 
(pie charts) were constructed for each level of analysis. The pie 
charts are included in Appendix c. 
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TABLE X 
GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY ANALYSIS 
Generally Moderately Highly 
Stable Stable Stable Unstable Total 
Armed 80.9 67 .3. 24.9; 62.?: 
Assault or 
Ambush 43 73 35 85 236 
33.6i 27.9 10.3' 26,0· 
Assassination 
23 25 6 44 98 
Barricade 25.3 21.1 7.8 19.6 
and Hostage 
25 18 7 24 74 
Explosive 380,2 316.5 117.4 294.7 
Bombing 
470 309 111 219 1109 
44,2 36.8 13.6 34,2 
Hijacking 
59 28 15 27 129 
Incendiary 109.0 90.7. 33.6 84.5 
Device or 
Arson 112 126 21 59 318 
67.2 55.9 20.7 52.0 
Kidnapping 
15 38 37 106 196 
46.2 38.5' 14.2 35.8 
Other 
40 38 11 46 135 
Total 787 655 243 610 2295 
p = ·,05; 21 degrees of freedom 2 'X- = 244.9· 
Source: Calculated by £mthor. 
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To portray the complete picture of findings, Table XI includes 
all variables which were analyzed. An "X" in a cell denotes that more 
of that particular technique occurred in the category than would be 
expected. Obviously, some of the cells will have a very small differ-
ence between observed and expected frequencies. Therefore, if the 
difference is less than five, the cell will contain an "X" which is 
enclosed in parentheses. 
Examination of Table XI reveals that a noticeable pattern does 
exist. There appears to be a link between certain techniques which 
are found to occur more often than would be expected in given situa-
tions. The techniques of armed assault or ambush, assassination, 
barricade and hostage, kidnapping and other can be grouped into one 
pattern whereas, explosive bombing, hijacking, and incendiary device 
or arson can be grouped into another. The first group occurs more 
often in Latin America, the Middle. East and North Africa, countries 
which ar~ not highly urbanized, countries with low and medium level 
gross national products, countries with intermittent and internally 
and/or externally absent freedom of the press, and countries with 
moderately stable to unstable govermnents. The second group occurs 
more often in North America and \-T estern Europe, countries which are 
highly urbanized, countries with high level gross national products, 
countries with complete freedom of the press, and countries with highly 
stable govermnents. Although these patterns do not represent exact 
laws to be followed, they do offer further areas for discussion, par-
ticularly on why the conditions described above nurture the use of 
certain techniques more than others. 
TABLE XI 
SUMMARY TABLE 
Region Ur"lxl,niza- GNP Freedom of Governmental tion the Press Stability 
§"~ z::s: §"~ t_:r:j~ ::r: t-1 4l::r: 41!3': 0t-l 0 H ;I>~H w::r: 
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Amed Ass X X X X X 
Ambush 
X X X X 
Assassination X (X) (X) X (X) X 
Barricade and (X) X (X) (X) (X) Hostage 
Explosive X X X X X X Bombing 
Hijacking X (X) X (X) X X (X) 
Incendiary X X X 
Device/Arson 
X X (X) X 
Kidnapping X X X X X X X 
Other X X X X (X) (X) (X) 
X: Observed frequency greater than expected frequency 
(X): Observed frequency greater than expected frequency, the difference between the two is 














The chi squared analyses in this chapter resulted in significant 
findings in all five levels of analysis. Calculation of C, however, 
revealed only weak relationships between the variables. The strongest 
relationship was found in the regional level of analysis. These 
results will be combined with the patterns of distributions on the 
maps in an attempt to formulate some general conclusions based on these 
results. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERPRETATION OF STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The outcomes of the chi squared analyses in Chapter III yielded 
significant results for all five levels of analysis. Although these 
results have been explained, a subjective interpretation of them is 
included in this chapter. The goal of this interpretation is not only 
explanation of possible reasons behind the results, but also explana-
tion of the consequences of the findings. In order to simplify under-
standing of the interpretations which are presented, three subsections 
are outlined: 1) an interpretation for each level of analysis, 2) a .. 
general summary of the above, and 3) an explanation of the possible 
consequences of the results. Chapter IV will conclude with suggestions 
for future research. 
A. Level 1 - Regional 
The most significant finding of the regional level of analysis is 
the prevalence of terrorist kidnappings in Latin America. This pattern 
was reflected in both Figure 8 and Table VI. The general conclusion, 
therefore, is that terrorists operating in Latin America employ the 
technique of kidnapping more often than terrorists in other regions 
and more often than would be expected by chance. The underlying reason 
for the popularity of this technique may simply be that it has been 
found to be very effective·in this region. Countries of Latin America 
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are, in large part, areas which have very wide class distinctions--a 
small but powerful upper class, a large poor lower class, and a re-
latively small but emerging middle class. Added to this socioecono-
mic situation is a large number of foreign owned corporations which 
have bases of operations in many Latin American countries (e.g. IBM, 
Coca Cola, Ford, and Mercedes Benz). Corporate executives of these 
companies are frequently targets of kidnappings. The demanded ran-
soms are high--frequently in excess of $100,000 and, in most cases, 
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the ransom is paid by the corporation. It has, therefore, proven to be 
profitable to the terrorists to engage in such activity. Kidnapping of 
government officials, on the other hand, is not particularly profitable 
because few governments permit the payment of ransom to terrorists. 
Another significant finding in Level 1 concerns the prevalence of 
the use of bombs and incendiary devices in Western Europe. Figure 3 
portrayed the widespread use of explosive bombs. Use of incendiary 
devices or arson, as shown in Figure 2, is not as widespread, however, 
if these two maps are compared it appears that those countries which 
have experienced the most explosive bombings also have experienced at-
tacks in which incendiary devices were used. According to the chi 
squared analysis for Level 1 many more bombings have occurred in Western 
Europe than would be expected. The numerous bombings carried out by 
the Irish Republican Army in Great Britain, a very active group which 
usually resorts to bombings, contributes to this finding. It is likely 
that the highly urbanized and industrialized nature of Western Europe 
is a reas0n for the popularity of the bomb in this region. This will 
be examined more fully in the next section. 
68 
Less significant than the results discussed above is the finding 
of the chi squared analysis for armed assaults or ambushes. More spe-
cifically, more armed assaults than would be expected took place in 
Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa, and less took place 
in Western Europe and North America than would be expected. It is dif-
ficult to rationalize this finding on purely regional differences or 
similarities and, therefore, it must be assumed that the reasons for 
this finding lie in other conditions. 
B. Level 2 - Degree of Urbanization 
As was to be expected, more hijackings occurred in highly urban-
ized countries. The most obvious reason for this is the availability 
of targets--more airports and more airline travel. There were also 
more explosive bombings in urbanized countries, a fact also supported 
by the prevalence of bombings in Western Europe, a highly urbanized 
region. Similarly, this is most likely a function of availability of 
targets. Rarely do bombings occur in rural villages because the impact, 
both physical and psychological, is greater in an urbanized area. 
More interesting, perhaps, is the finding that more kidnappings 
occurred in rural countries than would be expected. This is possibly 
because a kidnapping is more easily accomplished in a relatively iso-
lated area, easier for the terrorists to "gral:f' a victim in an area 
where there are less people to hinder the operation. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that the relatively large number of kidnaP-
pings occur in rural countries not because of the ease with which they 
can be accomplished, but rather because other options are not feasible 
to the terrorists. For example, bombings, arson, hijackings, and 
barricade and hostage incidents are more often associated with urban 
targets and, therefore, may not be viable options for terrorists opera-
ting in countries which are not highly urbanized. 
c. Level 3 - Economic (Gross National Product) 
The technique of kidnapping figured prominently in the differences 
between the observed and expected frequencies for Level 3, as in the 
two previous levels of analysis. More kidnappings occurred in countries 
with low and medium level gross national products than would be ex-
pected, and less occurred in countries with high level gross national 
products. The economic angle in kidnappings has already been men-
tioned in Section A. Terrorists operating in countries which are char-·-
aG.terized by lower gross national products may find difficulty in 
obtaining financial backing for their activities. Therefore, they may 
be forced to resort to obtaining their own funding through the profit-
able kidnapping technique. 
Use of armed assaults or ambushes was also found to be signific-
antly higher than would be expected in countries with low and medium 
level gross national products. It is possible that this is a popular 
technique in these countries because of the relative ease of terrorist 
groups in obtaining firearms. It appears that a pattern exists between 
kidnappings and armed assaults, a pattern which was also revealed in 
Table XI. 
D. Level 4 - Freedom of the Press 
Countries in which there is virtually no freedom of the press ex-
perienced significantly more armed assaults or ambushes than would be 
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expected, and to a lesser degree experienced more kidnappings. It is 
likely that there are underlying conditions which contribute to this 
situation. Freedom of the press is a variable which partially reflects 
the political freedom of a country. This, combined with the economic 
variable and the urbanization variable, may yield information which 
could be used to interpret this pattern. 
Role of the media must also be considered when examining the pos-
sible interpretations for this level of analysis. Assassinations, 
events which are sure to get widespread publicity, occurred more often 
in countries with intermittent freedom of the press. Because of the 
fluctuating nature of what the media might be allowed to publicize in 
these countries, it is possible that terrorists operating within them 
would choose techniques which are sure to get them publicity. Indeed, 
in both the intermittent and internally and/or externally absent cate-
gories of Table IX it was found that less explosive bombings and incen-
diary devices were used than would be expected. Both of these tech-
niques were more common in countries with complete freedom of the 
press, where even a relatively small-scale bombing incident which 
caused little or no damage would be reported to the public. 
E. Level 5 - Governmental Stability 
It appears from examining the data that governments which are 
either moderately stable or highly unstable are more often subjected to 
kidnappings. This is likely to be caused, in part, by the inability of 
these governments to effectively handle kidnap situations or to protect 
possible kidnap victims because of the unstable nature of the govern-
ment. More assassinations also occurred in countries Hi th highly 
71 
unstable governments than would be expected. This might be a function 
of the situation mentioned above--the government's inability to protect 
possible targets--or it is equally likely that the prevalence of kid-
napping and assassinations in these countries has contributed to the 
instability of the government. The most logical conclusion is that 
both of these forces are at work simultaneously, fostering conditions 
which will continue the pattern in a cyclical nature. This same idea 
might be applied to the technique of armed assault or ambush, which 
occurred more often than would be expected in countries with moderately 
stable and highly unstable governments. 
F. Summary of Interpretations 
The general conclusions pertaining to specific situations which 
were presented in the preceding sections may be applied to situations 
in reality. For example, if it is known that more kidnappings occur 
in Latin America, specific policies may be formulated which are designed 
to prevent such occurrences or more efficiently handle them when they 
do occur, The situations which appear to contribute to the use of 
certain techniques have been clearly identified, possible reasons for 
these situations have been discussed, and it is hoped that an under-
standing of these patterns can contribute to a greater understanding of 
the phenomenon of terrorism as a whole. 
G. Consequences of Results 
Although clear understanding of the patterns of terrorism is an 
admirable goal, the interpretation of the results of this study can 
and should be taken one step further, to a discussion of possible 
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applications of the findings. This section, therefore, is devoted to a 
postulation of possible applications of the results. Applications 
presented here vary widely in scope including specific recommendations 
as well as general suggestions • 
. An example of the suggestions has already been mentioned in Sec-
tion F--that if it is known that more kidnappings occur in Latin 
America, specific policies to deal with these occurrences should be 
formulated. This suggestion can be narrowed to apply more specifi-
cally to Latin American rural countries with low and medium level gross 
national products, intermittent or internally andjor externally absent 
freedom of the press with relatively unstable governments. However, 
the problem is more widespread, and although these countries would 
appear to be in the most danger of experiencing kidnappings, all 
countries which fall into at least one of these categories should be 
aware of the possibilities. One consequence of the high number of kid-
nappings of corporate executives in such countries is the development 
and increase in the sale of kidnap insurance. Many corporate execu-
tives, particularly in high-risk areas, are insured against such 
possible occurrences. Although this protects the company from finan-
cial losses due to the payment of ransom, it has a positive effect on 
the number of kidnappings. Easy payment of ransom makes kidnapping 
more profitable to the terrorists. It would perhaps be better to in-
crease security measures around probable targets and institute non-
payment of ransom policies, thus making the technique less attractive. 
Hijackings provide another technique by which a better under-
standing of the phenomenon would help in its combattance, especially 
in the United States. The United States, by far, has been plagued 
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the most by hijackings. However, most of these occurred before the for-
mulation of the stricter security measures in use now in all airports 
across the country. After the execution of these measures, the number 
of hijackings in the United States dropped dramatically. Recently, 
there has been a resurgence of hijackings in which the perpetrator 
uses a. glass container filled with a flammable liquid which can be 
carried through metal detectors without detection. Understanding that 
this situation is occuring should bring about new policies and security 
measures that are designed to combat this new threat. 
Assassinations, rare occurrences compared to the use of other 
techniques, can probably best be combatted by tighter security, making 
it more difficult for the terrorist to reach possible targets. The 
same methods might be used to prevent armed assaults and ambushes. 
Another method which might prove useful in this situation would be 
stricter controls on firearms and ammunition--both legally anQ illegally 
obtained. The ease with which a terrorist group is able to arm itself 
has contributed greatly to the number of incidents involving weapons 
ranging from pistols to heat-seeking missiles. 
It appears that there is little hope for controlling the use of 
bombs or incendiary devices. These techniques, as already mentioned, 
are associated with terrorist groups of all sizes and levels of devel-
opment. They represent the simplest weapons available to terrorists, 
and yet, are capable of great destruction. One possible, yet ineffi-
cient, solution to this might be to monitor more closely the activities 
of all terrorist groups. This, however, is not a particularly accept-
able solution in liberal societies. 
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Use of other techniques is just as difficult to control as the 
use of bombs because of the varied nature of the attacks. Techniques 
such as sabotage and chemical poisonings are so unexpected that little 
can be done to prevent them. If policy makers, however, are aware of 
the possibilities, measures can be designed to handle the situations 
when they do occur. 
The applications which have been presented here represent only a 
small number of possible responses to terrorism, However, based on 
information concerning past attitudes towards terrorism it is obvious 
that other problems must be overcome in order for such responses to 
be put into action. This is, in part, due to the fact that policy 
makers disagree about the consequences of terrorism. There is no world-
wide council which is empowered with the right to make and execute 
regulations on terrorism. Many governments today openly or covertly 
support terrorism and the rest resort to the same tactics and techniques 
in the name of counterterrorism. 
Because of this situation, it is perhaps more important to attempt 
to understand this complex phenomenon than to attempt to control it 
through imperfectly formed measures, Thus far, little has been men-
tioned in this report concerning the nature of terrorism and its place 
within the cultural framework of society. The fact is that although the 
form of terrorism today is different from past forms (terrorists of the 
past did not have access to the weapons such as heat seeking missiles 
which are available today) the use of terror for political purposes was 
used throughout history and will continue to be used in the future. 
There is no way to eradicate terrorism. 
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Understanding this idea involves a return to the definition of 
terrorism. Through objective application of this definition it can be 
shown.that most incidents which are not popularly considered terroris-
tic are, in reality, acts of terrorism. Because the word, terrorism, 
carries a negative connotation, rarely do governments or individuals 
apply it to their own actions. Instead, terrorism is what the "other" 
people do. But, if we are to objectively study terrorism, the label 
must be attached to any act which fits the criteria of the definition. 
Objective application of the definition of terrorism used in this 
analysis reveals that in August, 1945 the United States government com-
mitted an act of terrorism. This particular incident, however, has 
never been considered terroristic, at least not from an American per-
spective, The incident is the bombing of the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. According to the defini-
tion, terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political pur-
poses (this incident involved both as the Japanese were threatened by 
President Truman of the possibility in July before the bombs were 
dropped in August), whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority (again, both as the action was for the estab-
lished authority of the Allied countries and against the established 
authority of the Japanese government), when such actions are intended 
to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate 
victims (the target group was the Japanese government, the victims 
were those killed in the incident, and the goal of the incident was 
indeed intimidation). The incident was successful in that it is gener-
ally agreed that it served to bring an early end to the war. However, 
when viewed from a biased viewpoint, the incident is believed to have 
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been an unfortunate, though necessary, act of war. Numerous other inci-
dents which involved the use of terrorism but were not labelled as such 
can be found in the past, including the activities of resistance move-
ments and underground organizations as well as double agents and spies. 
The purpose of this discussion is to prove that, through objective 
application of the definition, terrorism is not just "what the other 
people do." Anyone who engages in an action which fits the criteria 
of the definition is using terrorism. No amount of justification can 
change this fact. Viewed from this perspective it logically follows 
that not only can terrorism not be eradicated, but also perhaps it 
should not be eradicated. The most important aspect of this idea is 
that governments and individuals must begin to admit that they them-
selves are indeed doing the same as those they are in opposition to. 
This admission should promote greater insight into their own actions 
and perhaps also nurture a new respect for those that they oppose. 
This discussion has not been included to overshadow the results or 
the interpretations of this analysis. Rather, it was included to give 
a more realistic view of terrorism. Counterterrorist measures may suc-
ceed in part in controlling terrorism and research can certainly con-
tribute to our knowledge concerning such measures, but it is more 
important that people begin to understand what terrorism actually is. 
The following section describes suggestions for future research, both on 
the ideas presented here and on related ideas. 
H. Suggestions for Future Research 
One of the most important things to learn for anyone who attempts 
research on terrorism, or virtually any subject, is the importance of 
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reading and understanding what others have done before them. Statisti-
cal analysis is not always valuable by itself. The research should 
include logical interpretations based not only on the results of the 
calculations but also on related theories, ideas, and information. It 
is hoped that the conclusions associated with this research are good 
examples of such interpretation. 
It has already been mentioned that there is a need for more objec-
tive analyses of terrorism. Difficulties associated with such analysis 
were listed, and suggestions for overcoming the difficulties were pro-
vided. Hopefully, this research has shown that the difficulties can 
be overcome and that such analysis is not only possible, but also valu-
able. With this in mind, suggestions for further research on this and 
related topics are presented here. 
The role of the media in terrorism is a fascinating subject which 
should be researched more completely. Although it might be a difficult 
subject to analyze statistically, related studies which were mentioned 
in Chapter II revealed that it is possible to develop analogies, and 
through the method of comparison, examine the subject from different 
perspectives. Statistical analysis might be possible if a method were 
devised to measure the effect of media-supplied publicity on terrorist 
incidents. 
Research which is similar in form to this analysis, only including 
more variables, would also be possible. Other variables which might be 
used include social and cultural variables, as well as more political 
variables. Another possible subject for research might be to study the 
effect which existing laws, statutes, and regulations have on terror-
ism. Research on the public's attitudes toward terrorism would be 
78 
valuable in analyzing the psychological effects of terrorism. Research 
on a smaller scale, approached perhaps from a regional or national • 
level, would enhance understanding and increase knowledge of particular 
groups. 
It should be stated again that the statistical analysis of terror-
ism has not often been attempted. This should not discourage interested 
persons from undertaking research, rather it should promote the need 
for more information. Further research need not be on something which 
no one has considered before, although the pioneers are important in 
the study of any subject. The goal of research might simply be to at-
tempt to support past findings. Whatever form it takes, research on 
terrorism is needed because before one can objectively deal with the 
situation it must be understood. 
J. Conclusions 
This particular research proved to be an exciting and challenging 
undertaking. Although prediction is virtually impossible when studying 
terrorism, patterns and trends were analyzed. Close examination of 
these patterns yielded logical assumptions about the nature of terrorism 
and these assumptions resulted in generalizations which were applied 
to reality. 
Possibly the most exciting part of conducting and writing this 
research, however, was the suggestions for practical application of the 
findings. Based on the calculations of the data and prior knowledge of 
the subject, viable options for policy makers were offered in order to 
attempt to control terrorism. But as was already pointed out, control-
ling terrorism may not be the proper solution in all cases. To 
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understand terrorism in the contemporary world a researcher must be 
able to overcome the negative connotation associated with the word. 
Terrorism is not always bad, often useful, and sometimes necessary. 
This perspective should promote not only understanding and awareness, 
but also objectivity. Governments have been and will continue trying 
to control the terrorism of the "other" people while engaging in such 
acts themselves. But, the solutions and alternatives they employ 
must be examined carefully and weighed in relation to the associated 
consequences, both short range and long range and, when they are con-
sidered, an objective viewpoint such as described above should be 
assumed. It is hoped that this research has, in some way, contributed 
to the knowledge necessary for such understanding of the reality of 
terrorism in the contemporary world. 
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Trinidad & Tobago ~0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 ;---· 
Tunisia 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 3 
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Turkey 3 5 0 1 17 63 2 4 95 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 4 
United Arab Emir. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
United Kingdom 10 10 6 0 11 167 2 2 209 
USSR 2 0 0 0 r 0 0 0 4 ._ 
United States 9 55 8 48 17 182 7 2 328 
Upper Volta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 12 3 0 1 3 4 0 8 31 
Venezuela 2 5 0 1 7 6 0 2 23 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yemen (Aden) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
-
Yemen (Sana) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Yugoslavia 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 7 
Zaire 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Zambia 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 6 





Latin America Middle East/North Africa 
1. Armed Assault/ Am bush 
2. Assassination 
5. Hijacking 
6. Incendiary Device/Arson 
3. Barricade and Hostage 7. Kidnapping 
4. Bombing 8. Other 
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C (CONTINUED) 
Level of Urbanization 
1. Armed Assault/Ambush 
2. Assassination 










1. Armed Assault/ Ambush 
2, Assassination 











Freedom of the Press 
Intermittent 
1. Armed Assault/Ambush 
2. Assassination 

















1. Armed Assault/Ambush 
2. Assassination 
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